After being briefed and hearing oral arguments on the matter, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Department determined that the State University of New York, Purchase College's ("SUNY Purchase") decision to suspend John Doe for a year was not supported by substantial evidence. The case was handled by Warshaw Burstein LLP's Title IX and College Discipline group, with Partner Kimberly Lau presenting the oral argument.

​John Doe was expelled after being found responsible for stalking, sexual harassment, and sexual exploitation.  The Court denied in part NYU’s motion to dismiss, holding that John stated a claim for Title IX erroneous outcome, Title IX selective enforcement, NYCHRL, and promissory estoppel for receiving a sanction above and beyond what John’s advisor promised.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals becomes the fifth court of appeals to forgo doctrinal tests for Title IX, and instead merely asks "do the alleged facts, if true, raise a plausible inference that the university discriminated against the student on the basis of sex?" The Court answered this question in the negative and affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title IX, and Equal Protection claims. The Court also found no protected property interest at stake, granting Defendant Debose qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s due process claims.

Eighth Circuit affirms dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim because Plaintiff was unable to prove that she was engaged in a protected activity. No part of Title IX designates participation in a sexual harassment investigation on the side of the accused as protected activity.

Plaintiff’s pre-assault claim survived Niagara University’s motion to dismiss.  The Court held that Niagara had actual knowledge of the heightened risk of sexual assault by male swimmers, and its systemic failure to intervene could be plausibly linked to Jane Doe-2’s sexual assault.  Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and post-assault claims were dismissed.

After successfully petitioning for a TRO and reaching a settlement with UCONN that vacated the findings and sanctions against John Doe, and required UCONN to hold a new hearing with increased due process protections, Doe moved to recover attorney’s fees. The Court held that Doe was the prevailing party and awarded Doe a substantial portion of his requested attorney’s fees.

John Doe’s motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was denied. Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his Title IX and due process claims. Plaintiff failed to cast articulable doubt on the accuracy of Texas A&M’s disciplinary proceeding. Doe also failed to show facts necessary to support an inference of bias. The Court also held that the delay in Doe’s education and any reputational damage he may suffer is compensable and/or speculative.

Student’s deliberate indifference claim survives summary judgment because a reasonable juror could find the university’s failure to consider the issue of incapacitation clearly unreasonable under the circumstances. Student’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim failed because she could not show that the university undertook an affirmative duty to conduct the investigation in a reasonable manner.

Plaintiff’s defamation and tortious interference claims against Jane Doe were dismissed. Court held that Yale’s University-Wide Committee on Sexual Misconduct proceedings were quasi-judicial and granted Doe absolute immunity for the allegedly defamatory statements she made at the hearing.

Plaintiff Jane Doe survives Montana State University’s motion to dismiss. The Court held that the general pleading standard of FRCP Rule 9(b) applies to allegations of intent in Title IX cases. The Court also found sufficient allegations to support a finding of an official policy or custom of discrimination.

Rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the University of Michigan, finding that the University was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s complaints of sexual harassment. The University took proactive measures to protect the Plaintiff and ratcheted up protections for Plaintiff after each new violation by the Respondent.

Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order. Plaintiff is an NYU student who was suspended for one semester for violating COVID-19 policy. Court held that Plaintiff did not face irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO, and that Plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits.

Investigator’s personal statements on Twitter did not call into question their ability to review the allegations objectively. Without evidence of individualized gender bias affecting Plaintiff’s disciplinary proceedings, there was no triable issue on sex discrimination.

Maryland District Court follows the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in foregoing doctrinal tests for Title IX.  Plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim is dismissed because there was no basis for Plaintiff to maintain two separate Title IX claims.  In the alternative, Plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim was dismissed for failure to identify a female comparator.

John Doe’s lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia was successful in overcoming the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Doe filed a lawsuit against American University alleging that the school mishandled a sexual assault allegation into Doe, which resulted in a year-and-a-half suspension. Plaintiff brought five causes of action, each under Title IX and the D.C. Human Rights Act, two breach of contract claims, and one negligence claim. The District Court granted the University’s motion to dismiss in part, denying the motion on Doe’s Title IX claim, D.C. Human Rights Act claim, as well as several breach of contract claims.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted was denied, as the court found Title IX provides a private right of action for employees of covered institutions alleging intentional sex-based discrimination.  

Plaintiff’s motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking reinstatement as a student and to enjoin the University of the Sciences from imposing any disciplinary sanctions against him was denied because Plaintiff failed to establish immediate, irreparable harm if an injunction was not granted.

The Fourth Circuit held that Defendant school board’s bathroom policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it treated Plaintiff worse than his cisgender peers. Likewise, Defendant violated Title IX because the school board was necessarily referring to Plaintiff’s sex to determine incongruence between sex and gender. Therefore, sex was a but-for cause for the Defendant’s actions.

Jane Doe was subjected to years of ongoing employee-on-student sexual misconduct. However, the misconduct never came to the attention of a staff member with the ability to institute corrective action. Without actual knowledge of the misconduct, Defendant school district could not be liable under Title IX. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s §1983 claims failed because Jane was unable to prove the requisite causal link between Defendant’s actions and the injury Jane suffered.

Student’s breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims survived Harvard’s motion to dismiss. Harvard’s policies guaranteed John a follow-up interview between his first interview and the conclusion of the investigation, which Harvard did not grant him. John’s Title IX claims failed because the allegations did not show that gender bias caused the findings against John.

Third Circuit declines to follow the Second Circuit’s holding in Yusuf v. Vassar College and, instead, chooses not to impose doctrinal tests when pleading gender bias to support a Title IX cause of action. The Court also held that promises of fair and equitable treatment under the University of the Sciences policy were enforceable. The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that John Doe stated a claim for both Title IX and breach of contract.

John Doe’s selective enforcement claim will proceed to trial after the Court denies both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the issue. It will be up to the jury to decide whether John was incapacitated and if Syracuse’s decision not to open an investigation into Jane’s potential misconduct was motivated by gender bias. John’s erroneous outcome claim was dismissed because there was insufficient evidence to show gender bias motivated Syracuse’s findings against John.

Plaintiff student’s motion for a Temporary Restraining Order was denied. Plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits and failed to show that he would suffer irreparable harm if the Court did not grant injunctive relief.

Student’s Title IX sexual harassment claim survives the University of Michigan’s summary judgment motion. The student alleged he was subjected to quid pro quo sexual harassment, and that he was sexually assaulted by now-disgraced former opera star David Daniels. The evidence supports a finding that the University of Michigan had actual notice of the danger Daniels posed to students, and that its response to warning signs was deliberately indifferent.

Student Jane Doe’s Title IX claim survived summary judgment because there was sufficient evidence the University of Alabama’s response to Jane being sexually assaulted was deliberately indifferent

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a female student’s deliberate indifference claim is sufficient to survive summary judgment. While the University of Michigan took steps to stop the harassment, it was clear that the respondent continued to engage in harassing behavior and that further measures may have been necessary to put a stop to the harassment.

Plaintiff’s Title IX erroneous outcome claim was allowed to proceed because there was enough evidence that Columbia gave preferential treatment to the female complainant, Columbia was facing pressure over its mishandling of Title IX complaints, and Columbia erroneously found Plaintiff to be responsible for sexual misconduct despite hundreds of photographs in evidence and an audio recording in support of Plaintiff. Columbia’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s contract-based claims was granted in part and denied in part.

John Doe’s breach of contract claim was dismissed because Virginia law did not support finding an implied-in-law contract. Doe’s negligence claims were dismissed because no legal duty existed between student and university under Virginia law.

Court granted TRO allowing John Doe to return to class pending litigation of his motion for a preliminary injunction. John Doe was able to show under the heightened standard for a mandatory injunction that he was entitled to a TRO.

TRO granted, preventing UCONN from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing against two students. Students were able to show proceeding with the disciplinary hearing would result in irreparable harm, the existence of sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation, and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in their favor.

Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration where it merely reiterated the same arguments the Court had already considered when initially deciding Defendant’s summary judgment motion.

John Doe’s administrative appeal was remanded to the Superior Court following the Arizona Court of Appeals’ finding that Arizona State University’s decision to expel John Doe was not supported by substantial evidence. In a simultaneous suit brought in the District of Arizona, Doe’s Title IX claim was allowed to proceed, while his due process and state law claims were dismissed.

John Doe was permitted to proceed with his Title IX erroneous outcome claim where the allegations in the complaint showed he was treated differently than his accuser during the adjudicative process. However, Doe’s due process and selective enforcement claims were dismissed.

John Doe survived a motion for summary judgment on his breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. Doe’s Title IX erroneous outcome claim was unsuccessful because he failed to show gender was a motivating factor in Johnson & Wales University’s decision.

The First Circuit reversed and vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction because Massachusetts’ breach of contract law does not require a private university to provide respondents an opportunity to cross-examine their accusers in order to comport with “basic fairness.”

Former graduate student brought suit against UMass Dartmouth for Title IX and due process violations stemming from a Title IX investigation that ultimately found insufficient evidence to hold him responsible. Student’s main claims survived UMass Dartmouth’s motion to dismiss.

Appellant’s due process rights were violated at trial where the State furnished false testimony to secure a guilty verdict. A prosecutor’s use of false testimony to obtain a conviction violates an individual’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the State’s use of false testimony in both the cross-examination of a witness, and their closing argument was reasonably likely to affect the judgment of the jury. The court reversed Appellant’s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of summary judgment in favor of UTA dismissing plaintiff’s Title IX claim. UTA’s credibility assessment was reasonable and did not support an erroneous outcome. Allegations that UTA provided preferential treatment to complainant, a gay man, over respondent, a straight man, was not gender biased since discrimination on the basis of “sexuality” is not “sex discrimination” for purposes of Title IX.

Plaintiff Doe challenges University’s expulsion with an Amended Complaint, asserting the University had been motivated by gender bias and had imposed an unfair disciplinary process while investigating two claims of sexual misconduct filed by two separate complainants six days apart. The University used a single investigator to examine these two independent complaints of sexual conduct. The District Court dismissed Doe’s Amended Complaint, holding his contentions were conclusory.

John Doe filed suit against Case Western Reserve University for breach of contract and violations of Title IX after he was found responsible for sexual misconduct and suspended. Granting the University’s motion for summary judgment, the Northern District Court of Ohio dismissed John Doe’s breach of contract claim because he failed to specify a right in the University’s policy that was violated. Additionally, the court dismissed John Doe’s Title IX claim because he failed to demonstrate that the investigator’s dissertation about female sexual risk motivated the University’s decision to discipline Doe.

Alleged investigative and procedural failings, coupled with allegations the University treated complaints differently depending on the gender of the parties, was sufficient to state a claim for erroneous outcome under Title IX.

Court denied John Doe’s motion for a preliminary injunction because the interim suspension was temporary in nature, and Doe was afforded an opportunity to argue at a hearing why such a suspension was unnecessary.

Plaintiff John Doe sued Rollins College after he was found responsible of violating the College’s Title IX Sexual Misconduct Policy.  The College’s investigation favored Jane Roe’s position over John Doe’s and gave more weight to her witnesses than his. Rollins College failed to equally enforce its own policies despite receiving information that both Jane Roe and John Doe breached the College’s Sexual Misconduct Policy. Plaintiff’s Title IX claims and breach of contract claim survived the College’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff David Jia sued the University of Miami after he was found responsible for sexual misconduct and sanctioned.  Plaintiff alleged several procedural errors and mounting pressure against the University to take a hard line toward male students accused of sexual assault as the basis of his Title IX claim. The complainant and a professor also made defamatory statements and leaked confidential hearing documents to the media in an effort to get Plaintiff expelled.  Plaintiff brought eight claims against the University and the University subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint.  The court dismissed Counts I, V, VI, VII, VIII and parts of Counts II and IV.  Plaintiff’s Title IX claims and portions of his defamation claims survived the University’s motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff John Doe brings suit against Princeton University for failure to postpone his Title IX interview until the proposed Title IX regulations take effect. After two postponements, Princeton scheduled the interview and John Doe filed a motion for preliminary injunction alleging four causes of action against Princeton. Although Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction was denied, his breach of contract claims were sustained. Whether Plaintiff’s extension request demonstrated “good cause” presents an issue of fact more appropriate for summary judgment.

Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction against Indiana University-Bloomington after he was suspended for 4 years for sexual misconduct. Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was barred by sovereign immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court concluded that the evidence did not support a claim of gender bias under Title IX. Plaintiff’s motion was denied for failure to show likelihood of success on the merits.  

Facing a Title IX investigation, but before the date of the hearing, Plaintiff filed this action in the Northern District of New York and sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin RPI from holding a hearing before the proposed Title IX regulations become effective. The Court held that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; any harm Plaintiff has asserted is speculative, and not at all actual or imminent.

The University of Mississippi’s Motion to Dismiss was denied as to plaintiff, Andrew Doe’s Title IX and due process claims. Doe stated a viable claim for due process based on the biased nature of the training materials provided to the Judicial Council, materials that encouraged determinations in favor of the complainant, as well as an inability to cross-examine complainant. Doe’s Title IX claim was sustained due to a flawed investigation by the Title IX coordinator, who failed to collect the testimony of key witnesses, excluded exculpatory evidence, ignored clear notice of a biased panel member and was treated less favorable than his counterpart for engaging in the same conduct.

Credibility determinations require effective cross-examination. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Six found that UCSB denied student due process by failing to provide the accused with access to critical evidence, and not allowing adequate opportunity to cross examine witnesses or present evidence in their own defense.